## Probability – Mutual information of mixed bivariate variable

Leave $$P ( mathbf {X}, Y)$$ be a discreet trivariate distribution where $$mathbf {X}$$ it is a bivariate random variable $$mathbf {X} = { mathbf {x} _1, dots, mathbf {x} _I } = {(x_1 ^ 1, x_1 ^ 2), dots, (x_I ^ 1, x_I ^ 2) }$$Y $$Y = {y_1, dots dots y_J }$$ A univariate variable.

We know
$$I (X ^ n; Y) triangleq sum_ {i, j} p ( mathbf {x} _i, y_j) cdot frac {p (x_i ^ n, y_j)} {p (x_i ^ n) cdot p (y_j)} ge 0, qquad text {para} quad n = 1,2$$

Now let's build $$bar {n} (i)$$, which, for each $$i = 1, points, I$$, can take the courage $$1$$ or $$2$$. We can define
$$I (X ^ bar {n}; Y) triangleq sum_ {i, j} p ( mathbf {x} _i, y_j) cdot frac {p (x_i ^ bar {n}, y_j)} {p (x_i ^ bar {n}) cdot p (y_j)} ge 0,$$

Question: Can we say that $$I (X ^ bar {n}; Y) ge 0$$ For any $$bar {n}$$?

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## Verification of the host name of the TLS mutual authentication client

The exact verification made with client certificates depends on the use case. For example, in SIP (voice over IP) it is common for the same system to be a client (initiating a call) and a server (accepting a call). In these cases, it is common for the same certificate to be used as a client and server certificate and to contain the host name of the SIP device. But with HTTPS it is more common for the client certificate to contain an email or other user-specific identification and no hostname.

Whether the subject of the certificate should be verified or not, it also depends on the use case. In some cases, the server knows what to expect and can verify that the certificate matches the expectation. But, for example, in HTTPS, the server generally only knows that it waits for a certificate issued by a specific CA (and verifies this expectation) and then simply assumes that the user information on the subject of the certificates is correct (since the CA it is reliable to put the correct information). there) and uses the extracted user information to determine which user has logged in, that is, instead of giving the user name in a login message.

## pr.probability – Mutual information always gives a negligible value

When I try to calculate the mutual information between two random variables, the value approaches zero regardless of the nature of the RVs.
The steps that I followed are,

``````def entropy (X):
p_X = X / np.sum (X)
return (-1 * np.sum (p_X * np.log (p_X)))

def joint_entropy (X, Y):
p_X = X / np.sum (X)
p_Y = Y / np.sum (Y)
sum = 0
for y_i in p_Y:
sum + = np.sum ((y_i * p_X) * np.log (y_i * p_X))
return (-1 * sum)

Mi = entropy (X_bin) + entropy (Y_bin) - joint_entropy (X_bin, Y_bin)
``````

X_bin and Y_bin are containers of histograms that have a count of members in the container. Any appreciation and help would be appreciated and thanks in advance.

## ubuntu – How to configure mutual SSL authentication between an ELK server (Logstash) and a remote Filebeat server?

I have 2 servers with Ubuntu 18.04:

• Monitoring.example.com (with ELK on a single server)
• www.example.com (with Filebeat)

Here is the configuration file `/etc/logstash/conf.d/logstash.conf` on the Monitoring.example.com server:

``````entry {
beats {
Port => 5044
}
}
exit {
elasticsearch {
hosts => ["localhost:9200"]
manage_template => false
}
}
``````

Here is the configuration file `/etc/filebeat/filebeat.yml` on the server www.example.com:

``````# ----------------------------- Logstash output ----------------- - --------------
output.logstash:
# The hosts of logstash
Hosters: ["monitoring.example.com:5044"]

# SSL optional. By default it is deactivated.
# List of root certificates for HTTPS server verifications
# ssl.certificate_authorities: ["/etc/ca.crt"]

# Certificate for SSL client authentication
# ssl.certificate: "/etc/client.crt"

# Client certificate key
# ssl.key: "/etc/client.key"
``````

Currently ELK works and receives the files of Filebeat. But the exchanges are not safe.

How to configure mutual SSL authentication between an ELK server (Logstash) and a remote Filebeat server?

I found this documentation:

https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/configuring-ssl-logstash.html

But, how to create the certificates and on what server should I create them?

TO UPDATE

I started changing my settings, but I am waiting for an answer to generate the certificates.

Here is the configuration file `/etc/logstash/conf.d/logstash.conf` on the Monitoring.example.com server:

``````entry {
beats {
Port => 5044
ssl => true
ssl_certificate_authorities => ["/etc/ca.crt"]
ssl_certificate => "/etc/server.crt"
ssl_key => "/etc/server.key"
ssl_verify_mode => "force_peer"
}
}
exit {
elasticsearch {
hosts => ["localhost:9200"]
manage_template => false
}
}
``````

Here is the configuration file `/etc/filebeat/filebeat.yml` on the server www.example.com:

``````# ----------------------------- Logstash output ----------------- - --------------
output.logstash:
# The hosts of logstash
Hosters: ["monitoring.example.com:5044"]

# SSL optional. By default it is deactivated.
# List of root certificates for HTTPS server verifications
ssl.certificate_authorities: ["/etc/ca.crt"]

# Certificate for SSL client authentication
ssl.certificate: "/etc/client.crt"

# Client certificate key
ssl.key: "/etc/client.key"
``````

## Mobile navigation: endless loop problem with two mutual reference screens

A part of my application is a collection of tasks that the user has to do. For each task, you can create the so-called "reports", where he describes certain steps he took to carry out the task and how well he did it. Reports are not limited by quantity, so there may be many for each task.

This is what the current flow looks like:

To have quick access to the currently active task, it has its own button in the main menu. This active task screen also shows the number of reports created for this task and links to the detailed reporting page.

The problem that I am facing is this:
Both screens are linked together, creating an infinite loop.
Of course, one option would be to remove one of the links completely, but that would not help the user.

My current idea is to make it dependent on the main screen that opened it and then simply hide the link button:

(And vice versa for the reverse)

Do you see problems that users might have with this solution?

It breaks the consistency and can be a bit confusing at first, but it is somewhat minor and should be easily learned. But maybe I'm missing something.

## How does Facebook recommend a friend (not a mutual friend)?

For example, Facebook recommends a friend:

1. We really know each other
2. We have no mutual friend on Facebook
3. We both have WhatsApp and we have the phone number of the other, but we never talk before WhatsApp. Or we are in the same group of whatsapp only. Does FB use WhatsApp contacts as a reference?
4. We are not friends in any of the applications of social networks, twitter, IG, etc.
5. We are from the same university, but the year of graduation differs in several years. And there are so many students …
6. I use the Android phone and never synchronize my contacts online.

It happens several times to recommend a correct friend.

I'm curious, in this case, what is the data source used by the FB algorithm to recommend a likely friend?

## JSON Jolt Transformation with mutual exclusion

I am trying to transform the JSON input using JOLT spec. My entry has a response element that can have a single text value (Case 1) or a JSON element (Case 2) as below

JOLT Spec:

``````[
{
"operation": "shift",
"spec": {
"@(1,status)": {
"@(2,output)": {
"response": "statusMessage"
},
"TERMINATED": {
"@(2,status)": "statusMessage"
},
"FAILED": {
"@(2,response)": "statusMessage"
},
"COMPLETED": {
"@(2,status)": "statusMessage"
}
},
"status": "status"
}
}
]
``````

Input (non-JSON response element). —-Case 1

``````{
"createTime": 1555623377858,
"updateTime": 1555623378681,
"state": "FAILED",
"exit": {
"response": "Connection error".
}
}
``````

Input (JSON response element). —- Case 2

``````{
"createTime": 1555623377858,
"updateTime": 1555623378681,
"state": "FAILED",
"exit": {
"ETag": [
"W/"5-fy9qFc+NorJ+Wkr0e1jnrXHAs9k""
],
"Connection": [
"keep-alive"
],
"Content length": [
"5"
],
"Date": [
"Thu, 18 Apr 2019 21:36:18 GMT"
],
"Type of content": [
"text/html; charset=utf-8"
],
"X-Powered-By": [
"Express"
]
}
"reasonPhrase": "Internal server error",
"body": "error",
"statusCode": 500
}
}
}
``````

How do I specify the JOLT specification if I want to assign "reasonPhrase" to statusMessage in the case that the response has a JSON element?

My exit should be seen as below

``````The answer to case 1 should be similar.
{
"statusMessage": "Connection error",
"state": "FAILED"
}

The answer of case 2 should look like this.
{
"statusMessage": "Internal server error",
"state": "FAILED"
}
``````

## python: processing of file inclusion policies by mutual recursion

`parseContent ()` call the two `re.finditer ()` Y `re.sub ()`, which is inefficient, because the `re.sub ()` you have to find the insertion point that `re.finditer ()` I had already found. What you want is only `re.sub ()`:

replica it can be a string or a function … If replica is a function, it is called for each non-superimposed appearance of model. The function takes a single match object argument and returns the replacement string.

Going further, you must make a single substitution step that handles both the comments and the ones included. (You did not teach us the `removeComments ()` code, so you'll have to adapt the regex yourself.)

The double quotes in the regular expression have no special meaning, and do not need to escape with backslashes. In addition, periods and underscores do not have to escape within a character class.

``````DIRECTIVE_RE = re.compile (r & # 39; (? P#. *) | (? P( s) * include + ( s *) "( s *) (? P[a-zA-Z0-9._/]*) ") & # 39;)

def process_content (self, rdb_file_path, content):
def policy_handler (match):
if match.group (& # 39; comment & # 39;):
come back & # 39; & # 39;
elif match.group (& # 39; include & # 39;):
path = os.path.join (rdb_file_path, match.group (& # 39; file & # 39;))
with open (path) as f:
return DIRECTIVE_RE.sub (policy_handler, content)
``````

`open()` it should almost always be called using a `with` block to make sure that the file identifier closes automatically.

Note that I have used `os.path.join ()` as a portable alternative to `+ "/" +`.

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