## Is the keyword of low competition and high search volume just an illusion or reality?

Hello Webmaster! I hope all of you are super good! Since the last two months, I am thinking about starting a new blog about home improvement or health and fitness category! When I searched Google for ideas on how to start a blog, thousands of results appeared and almost all of them suggested that I search for a keyword that has a "High search volume" and "Low" competency so I can quickly rank. I obeyed almost everyone, but when I started with researched keywords about various keywords of home improvements and niches of health and fitness keywords in the Google Keyword Planner and some other tools on the Internet, I did not find any of those keywords that have zero competence and a high search volume. !! It will be of great help to me if it helps me answer the following questions.

1: Is there a way to find keywords that have low competition and a high search volume and a high CPC in order to earn revenue?

2: Can I run the risk of working with highly competitive keywords that will be worth my time? Will they be classified for the subdomain of blogspot or wordpress?

3: What is the most beneficial category in terms of making money from the blog? Health or physical condition or improvements for the home.

4: Are micro-niches blogs better than niche ones? and they require less work for classification purposes

regards
A digital enthusiast

## mysql – How do I calculate the average weight of runners by competition?

I have a task in which I need to calculate the average weight of runners by competition. The task has many different parts, but I got stuck in this one, so please, help me if you can 🙂

So if I have the following tables:

``````CREATE TABLE Rider (
name VARCHAR (30),
Actual weight
PRIMARY KEY (name)
MOTOR = innodb;

CREATE TABLE Participants (
contest VARCHAR (30) NOT NULL,
rider VARCHAR (30) NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (competition, rider),
FOREIGN KEY (competence) REFERENCES Competence (name),
FOREIGN KEY (rider) REFERENCES Rider (name)
MOTOR = innodb;

CREATE MESA contest (
name VARCHAR (30),
PRIMARY KEY (name)
MOTOR = innodb;
``````

With the following data:

``````:: Riders ::
(Name: Weight)
Alan: 55
David: 60
Pedro: 65
Stan: 60

::Competition::
(First name)
Derby
York

::Participants::
(Contest: Rider)
Derby: Alan
Derby: David
York: Alan
York: Peter
York: Stan
``````

Therefore, the results that I should obtain from my SQL query for the different competences should be:

• Derby: 57.5 (Alan and David average)
• York: 60 (average of Alan, Peter and Stan)

How should I approach this SQL query?

## How to know why our website brought traffic?

The reason why I need to find out is that, as our redirection problem was solved, all website traffic has increased again, (both in English One) except the Chinese website.

We add more content, it's very easy to classify (without competition), so the traffic that was reduced is due to some configuration changes, maybe?
How can I recover my traffic? English-Website.jpg Red-Blue-Card.jpgChinese-Website.jpg

.

## dnd 5e – When a druid forms a wild beast that seems to have experience with a skill, should the druid competition bonus be doubled with that ability?

When a druid uses his characteristic wildly:

Your game statistics are replaced by the statistics of the beast, but
you preserve your alignment, personality and intelligence, wisdom and
Ratings of charisma. You also preserve all your ability and your saving throw.
Competences, in addition to winning those of the creature. If he
The creature has the same ability as you and the bonus in its statistics.
the block is higher than yours, use the bonus of the creature instead of yours.

Consider the example of a Druid of the Circle of the Moon, who has no competition in Stealth, taking the form of a saber-toothed tiger. The statblock of a saber-toothed tiger indicates that it has a +6 modifier to Stealth. Since the Beast's Dexterity modifier is +2, and a CR 2 beast has a +2 proficiency bonus (DMG Chapter 9), the saber-toothed tiger must have experience, or double competence, in Stealth. So, should the druid duplicate his skill bonus and add it to the saber-toothed tiger dexterity modifier, so that the druid with savage form has +8 to Stealth at level 6, +10 to Stealth at level 9 , etc.?

## Functions – Redirections of session initiation of the competition – Should they be combined?

I currently have two logon redirects in my general-functions.php file in my mu-plugins directory for my multisite installation.

The first is for someone who logs in from a specific page. That person must redirect back to that page after logging in. A "redirect_to" parameter in the URL handles it when the login URL is the following: http://example.com/wp-login.php?redirect_to=/example-page/

Here are the two functions:

``````function my_login_redirect (\$ redirect, \$ user) {
\$ redirect = isset (\$ _GET['redirect_to'] )? \$ _GET['redirect_to'] : wp_get_raw_referer ();
return \$ redirect;
}
add_filter (& # 39; user_registration_login_redirect & # 39 ;, & # 39; my_login_redirect & # 39 ;, 9, 2);

returns & # 39; /wp-admin/my-sites.php&#39 ;;
}
add_filter (& # 39; login_redirect & # 39 ;, & # 39; admin_default_page & # 39 ;, 10);
``````

Both functions work on your own. But sitting in the same file functions, the second wins and prevents the first works. I have tried to combine them, but without success. Obviously, it would make sense to check a "redirect_to" parameter and perform that redirect if it exists, then redirect all others to the My Sites page.

But for some reason, I can not figure out how to do this. I tried to change the priority of the add_filter, as you can see, but that did not work. I have tried to change the order in which the functions appear within the function file. This is not functional. I tried to combine the gills of each function within an if / else statement in any of the functions, and that did not work for me.

They are referring to two different hooks, so that may be my problem, but I need a way to combine the two functions or make them work independently, without the My Sites function winning each time, which is the current result .

Any help appreciated. Thank you!

## Design competition in progress …. No money limit

I need the word "FOCUSED" along with my logo (attached) in several ways to apply to the shirts. We can also include "STAY FOCUSED" in some designs.

** ALL DESIGNS MUST CONTAIN MY LOGO IN ANY WAY OR FASHION **

My current designs are a little outdated, so I want to come with something new for the summer.

There is no limit to the number of entries. For each ticket selected, I will pay \$ 10- \$ 25. Send 10 tickets and I'll go with 10, send \$ 100- \$ 250, etc. You can send any and all variations. Circular, rectangular, included images, etc. Simply create and keep it clean with the sources you choose. Attached is an example of some of the styles I already have.

Remember that these will apply to clothing, so be careful with super thin lines.

If you want to see the current designs, you can see them at www dot focus dot clothing

## Price and online competition.

Many different ways.

1) Maybe you are providing something that your competitors are not providing.
2) Maybe you have a faster shipping.
3) Maybe your site is easier to use.
4) Your customers may think that their competitors are skimping somewhere.
5) Maybe your customers did not see the competitor's website.
6) Maybe they like you and do not like your competitors.
7) Maybe your competitors have burned their customers in the past.

No matter what the reason, you can not win a price game with your competitors, so it is better to provide something that makes you different from the competitors.

Low price, good service, good quality
Choose any of the TWO, you can not have all three!

## Game theory: Nash equilibrium in the Cournot competition with two products.

QUESTION:

Suppose there are two types of products, labeled $$l$$ Y $$n$$. Companies compete in the market by choosing which product to sell and then choosing the quantities. Leave $$Q_n$$ Y $$Q_l$$ denote the total product demand $$n$$ Y $$l$$, respectively. Let the functions of reverse demand be given by:
begin {align *} & P_l (Q_l, Q_n) = (a + gamma) – Q_n – (1+ delta) Q_l \ & P_n (Q_l, Q_n) = a – Q_n – Q_l end {align *}
where $$P_l$$ Y $$P_n$$ denote product prices $$l$$ Y $$n$$, respectively, and $$a$$, $$gamma$$, $$delta$$ All constants are greater than zero. Leave $$q_l ^ i$$ Y $$q_n ^ i$$ denote the $$i$$The product output of the firm. $$l$$ Y $$n$$, respectively. Leave $$X_l ^ i$$ Y $$X_n ^ i$$ Denote the output of the other companies producing the product. $$l$$ Y $$n$$, respectively. Leave $$N_n$$ Y $$N_l$$ denote the number of companies that sell products $$n$$ Y $$l$$, respectively. Let the marginal cost of producing the $$l$$ product be $$c_n + c_p$$ and the marginal cost of producing the $$n$$ product be $$c_n$$. Find all the perfect subgame Nash equilibria in this game.

My work so far:

I have almost solved the question, but I am stuck towards the end of my work. What I have done so far is the following. First, set the number of companies that sell each product and solve the equilibrium amount options. Then, we can solve the equilibrium number of the companies that make each product.

A company that decides to sell the $$l$$ Product earns profits:
$$pi_l = (P_l – c_n – c_p) q_l ^ i cdots (1)$$
while a company decides to sell the $$n$$ Product earns profits:
$$pi_n = (P_n – c_n) q_n ^ i cdots (2)$$
Noting that $$Q_l = q_l ^ i + X_l ^ i$$ Y $$Q_n = q_n ^ i + X_n ^ i$$ and replacing the former and then taking first-order conditions with respect to $$q_l ^ i$$ (for $$(1)$$) Y $$q_n ^ i$$ (for $$(2)$$), respectively, produces:
begin {align *} & (a + gamma) – (1+ delta) X_l ^ i – Q_n – (c_n + c_p) – 2 (1+ delta) q_l ^ i = 0 cdots (1 & # 39;) & a – X_n ^ i – Q_l – c_n – 2q_n ^ i = 0 cdots (2 & # 39;) end {align *}
Since $$(1 & # 39;)$$, the best response function of a company that decides to sell. $$q_l ^ i$$ of product $$l$$ is given by
$$q_l ^ i = frac {(a + gamma) – (1+ delta) X_l ^ i – Q_n – (c_n + c_p)} {2 (1+ delta)}$$
but noticing that $$X_l ^ i = Q_l – q_l ^ i$$, we have
$$q_l ^ i = frac {(a + gamma) – (1+ delta) Q_l – Q_n – (c_n + c_p)} {1+ delta} cdots (3)$$.
Since $$(2 & # 39;)$$, the best response function of a company that decides to sell. $$q_n ^ i$$ of product $$n$$ is given by
$$q_n ^ i = frac {a-X_n ^ i – Q_l – c_n} {2}$$
but noticing that $$X_n ^ i = Q_n – q_n ^ i$$, we have
$$q_n ^ i = a-Q_n-Q_l-c_n cdots (4)$$.
From the right sides of $$(3)$$ Y $$(4)$$ they are constant, first order conditions imply that companies that make the same product produce the same amount in equilibrium. Since there are $$N_n$$ companies that do $$n$$ Y $$N_l$$ companies that do $$l$$, Thus:
begin {align *} & Q_l = N_lq_l ^ i \ & Q_n = N_nq_n ^ i. end {align *}
Substituting in $$(3)$$ Y $$(4)$$ we have the following
begin {align *} & Q_l = N_l left ( frac {(a + gamma) – (1+ delta) Q_l – Q_n – (c_n + c_p)} {1+ delta} right) cdots (5) & Q_n = N_n left (a-Q_n-Q_l-c_n right) cdots (6) end {align *}
Resolving $$(5)$$ Y $$(6)$$ simultaneously for $$Q_l$$ Y $$Q_n$$, we obtain the total sales of each product (with each company selling a certain product, selling the same amount):
begin {align *} & Q_l (N_l, N_n) = lambda N_l left ((N_n + 1) (a + gamma – c_n – c_p) – N_n (a-c_n) right) cdots (7) \ & Q_n (N_l, N_n) = lambda N_n left ((1+ delta) (N_l + 1) (a-c_n) – N_l (a + gamma – c_n – c_p) right) cdots ( 8) end {align *}
where
$$lambda = frac {1} {(1+ delta) (N_l + 1) (N_n + 1) – N_lN_n}$$. Therefore, in equilibrium, the amounts chosen by the companies that sell $$l$$ Y $$n$$ are, respectively:
begin {align *} & q_l (N_l, N_n) = frac {Q_l (N_l, N_n)} {N_l} \ & q_n (N_l, N_n) = frac {Q_n (N_l, N_n)} {N_n} end {align *}
To find the perfect Nash equilibrium of the subgame, we need additional ownership, that is, no company can have an incentive to change and produce the other product. The benefits of the production companies. $$l$$ Y $$n$$, respectively, are given by
begin {align *} & pi_l ^ i (N_l, N_n) = left[a+gamma – Q_n(N_l, N_n) – (1+delta)Q_l(N_l, N_n) – c_n – c_p right]q_l (N_l, N_n) \ & pi_n ^ i (N_l, N_n) = left[a – Q_n(N_l, N_n) – Q_l(N_l, N_n) – c_n right]q_n (N_l, N_n). end {align *}
One can show that $$pi_l ^ i (N_l, N_n)$$ is decreasing in $$N_l$$ Y $$pi_n ^ i (N_l, N_n)$$ is decreasing in $$N_n$$. Leave $$N = N_l + N_n$$ denotes the total number of companies in the market, then two types of equilibria can be summarized as follows:

1. Yes $$pi_l (1, N-1) < pi_n (0, N)$$, each of the $$N$$ companies sell $$q_n ^ * = Q_n (0, N) / N$$ of product $$n$$ where $$Q_n$$ satisfy $$(8)$$ and no company sells product $$l$$.
2. Yes $$pi_n (N-1, 1) < pi_l (N, 0)$$, each of the $$N$$ companies sell $$q_l ^ * = Q_l (N, 0) / N$$ of product $$l$$ where $$Q_l$$ satisfy $$(7)$$ and no company sells product $$n$$.

The intuition behind the balance that is listed in 1. is easy to see. Yes $$pi_l (1, N-1) < pi_n (0, N)$$, then we have
$$underbrace { pi_l (N, 0) < cdots < pi_l (1, N-1)} _ { text {Since} pi_l ^ i (N_l, N_n) text {is decreasing in } N_l} < underbrace { pi_n (0, N) < cdots < pi_n (N-1, 1)} _ { text {Since} pi_n ^ i (N_l, N_n) text { is decreasing in} N_n}$$
Therefore, in balance, any company that is producing. $$l$$ they are strictly better by diverting to production $$n$$, so that each firm produces $$n$$ in equilibrium. Intuition for 2. is similar.

Where I'm stuck

They tell me that there is another balance that is characterized by:

If the number of firms in the market and the values ​​of the parameters are such that the profits of the monopoly of selling a product exceed the profits of Cournot if all the firms sell the other product, then, ignoring the whole problems, the balance is found when establishing the profits from the sale of the product. two equal products and so $$N_l ^ *$$ Y $$N_n ^ *$$ satisfy
$$(1+ delta) (N_l ^ * + 1) (a – c_n) ^ 2 left[(1+delta)(N_l^*+1)(N-N_l^* + 1) – (N-N_l^*)^2 right] = (N-N_l ^ * +1) (a + gamma – c_n – c_p) ^ 2 left[(1+delta)(N-N_l^*+1)(N_l^*+1) – (N_l^*)^2 right] cdots (9)$$
$$N_n ^ * = N – N_l ^ * cdots (10)$$

Yes $$pi_l (1, N-1) ge pi_n (0, N)$$ Y $$pi_n (N-1, 1) ge pi_l (N, 0)$$, so $$N_l ^ *$$ companies sell $$q_l ^ * = Q_l (N_l ^ *, N_n ^ *) / N_l ^ *$$ of $$l$$; $$N_n ^ *$$ to sell $$q_n ^ * = Q_n (N_l ^ *, N_n ^ *) / N_n ^ *$$ of $$n$$ when equations (7), (8), (9) and (10) are met.

What is the reasoning behind this balance? Specifically, how are equations (9) and (10) produced? And what are they exactly $$N_n ^ *$$ Y $$N_l ^ *$$ And how are they produced in the construction of equilibrium?

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